

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Executive Registry

24 July 1976

76-98021

NOTE FOR: Chairman, SIGINT Task
Force

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[REDACTED]

I had a fascinating conversation with an elder statesman, [REDACTED] the other day. He came through a lot of old wars relating to SIGINT over the years. His knowledge is a bit outdated, but he is a very shrewd and competent observer in this area.

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The attached paper reflects some of his thoughts and concerns. He is more than willing to contribute his time and services for use free gratis at any time. I would suggest that from time to time you arrange to have a brief chat with [REDACTED] I know that you would find him interesting in connection with the problems you now chase. And for his part, he would have the thrill of being considered useful after several years on the side lines.

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[REDACTED]

E. H. Knoche
DDCI

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Attachment

5-15.3

TOP SECRET

YESTERDAY AND TOMORROWYesterday:

The Agency played a leading role in drafting and negotiating NSCID 9, approved by the President in 1953. This document provided for the establishment of NSA, consolidating the cryptological activities and responsibilities of the three services, and gave the DCI an important role in this intelligence field as well as authorising the Agency actively to develop COMINT capabilities in support of NSA. The community established and carried out its policy deliberations in USCIB (United States Communications Intelligence Board) chaired by the DCI. The CIA SIGINT officer represented the Agency and his views did not necessarily have to accord with those of the chairman. The USCIB secretariat was initially headed by Commander Rufus Taylor (later Deputy Director CIA) and was housed and administered by OCl. USCIB had a working committee chaired by a representative of the Dept. of State; this committee was also administered by the USCIB secretary. It should be noted that NSCID 9 deprived the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their previous jurisdiction over service SIGINT matters.

The above machinery was not modified for many years. The next developments were to merge USCIB with the AIC (Intelligence Advisory Committee) to become USIB, and with the increasing importance of ELINT to bring this aspect of intelligence formally within the intelligence family. This necessitated the up-dating and modifying of NSCID 9, which after lengthy negotiations became NSCID 6. The DCI's role and the

Agency's responsibilities were in no way diminished and the Agency's ELINT activities became formalised. As the 1960s passed the Agency's COMINT and ELINT activities continued to expand until about 1966, when a perceptible decline in COMINT priorities set in.

Lacking first-hand knowledge in depth of the SIGINT community's activities since 1969 I can only piece together and therefrom deduce that a further possibly considerable deterioration in the DCI's and the Agency's role in this field is taking place.

Tomorrow:

To get a handle on the present situation and assess it one should start by asking if the DCI and the Agency currently have the same responsibilities as they did under NSCID 6. If so, an examination of the present quality and effectiveness of CIA's assets in this field is needed to determine whether the DCI and the Agency retain the necessary across-the-board expertise to carry out these complex duties.

Among the aspects which should be appraised are the following:

1. The current DCID---is it up to date? Is it strictly enforced?
Are the interrelationships of the various Agency Sigint components harmonious? The components used to be the SIGINT officer and his SIGINT staff, the office of ELINT, other DDS&T components, office of security, office of communications, DDP Staff D, and corresponding DDP areas concerned.
2. Is the necessary high-level liaison with NSA, its ^{STATINTL} major sub-components for real and alive or largely formalistic?

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3. What is the current and prognosticated quality of intercept?
Is it realistic? Is a Baker-type report needed at this time?
4. How does the SIGINT Committee function? Why did the DCI
lose control of or cede the Committee chair to NSA?
5. Who reports to whom now since there is no USIB? Who signs
off on SIGINT matters?
6. Do CIA and State, i.e., the civilian elements of the intelli-
gence community, get satisfactory service against their re-
quirements? Or do the services' "all-inclusive requirements"
swamp the system?
7. Does DCI actually pass on NSA's budget or is it just pro-
forma? Who in the Agency is responsible for making recommen-
dations to the DCI in this field?

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12. Who is in charge of the very sensitive relationships with the FBI in the SIGINT field?
13. Who is in charge of SIGINT security in all its complicated aspects, within the Agency, within the White House, and the executive branch? Who, in practice, controls and monitors SIGINT security in STATINTL
14. Within the Agency, who controls the dissemination of raw SIGINT product? Who controls dissemination of the finished product which may contain SIGINT data or be raw data in itself? What are the checks and balances?
15. Who is responsible for spotting SIGINT leaks? Who has the corrective action? Most leaks come from on high due to ignorance (i.e. possibly ineffective briefings), carelessness and one-upmanship.
16. Does NSA send raw or even collated COMINT data direct to the White House? To other elements of the executive branch?

Lastly, if there exists a current NSCID that differs in a significant aspect from No. 6, many of the foregoing questions should probably be restated.

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Good luck!

July '76


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THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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
ATINTL Dear 

Many thanks for the grand lunch and intriguing conversation. You have always had a clarity of thought despite the complexity of problems in which you were engaged.

I have put your questions and observations into the hopper. We are most grateful and we will be in touch.

ATINTL All best wishes to you and 

Faithfully yours,



E. H. Knoche

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